In this work we present a quantitative security analysis of a dual-threshold homodyne quantum cryptography with two types of possible eavesdropping attacks in terms of the differential of mutual information.
Introduction
Quantum Cryptography deals with unconditionnally secure transmission of information. In order to investigate that, we analyze a Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) system transmitting information using Vernam coding that is said to be perfectly secure if we use a one-time pas cipher [1] . The presence of an eavesdropper introduces errors in the system and the overall security is measured as the differential mutual information. In this work we analyze a homodyne QKD system exhibiting a controllable decision threshold [5] and estimate the security level under several types of attack.
Homodyne system analysis
We use a phase coherent implementation of BB84 [2] . BB84 is a well-known protocol presented by C.H. Bennett and G. Brassard in 1984 in order to perform QKD with high reliability between Alice and Bob. This BB84 protocol uses two orthogonal bases x 1 and x 2 and two symbols per base, leading to a QPSK-type constallation. As Bob introduces his base choice, he maps the QPSK into a BPSK decision problem [4] . We introduce a threshold in the detection process [3] . A detection is considered correct only if the measured value is above a threshold x 0 . This improves the BER with a trade-off in key rate generation With this approach we have to use a new quantity P (x 0 , n) called postselection efficiency where n is the number of photons used in the process. In the absence of the eavesdropper Eve:
and the bit error rate [5] :
Evesdropping strategies
We are taking into account two eavesdropping strategies similar to those proposed by Hirano et al. in [3] .
Intercept and Resend Strategy
In this scheme, Eve splits the signal into two parts and performs a detection on the two BB84 bases. She stores the values of her measurements, and she sends to Bob a state. This state is the most probable state according to her measurements i. e. the state corresponding to the highest value measured. To acquire as much information as she can, Eve stores each measurement she makes, until the revelation of bases during reconciliation. And when at reconciliation, she discovers that she was mistaken in a base choice, she can use the value corresponding to the other base.
Intermediate basis attack
In this scheme Eve performs measurements on an intermediate base for all the qubits she receives. This intermediate base is simply described by (x 1 +x 2 )/ √ 2. Eve saves and resends to Bob the value she obtained. At reconciliation she uses the value she stored to try to restore Alice's sent state with the base information. 
Security achievement

Bit Error Rate
Bob's detection efficiency depends on the action of Eve. Heisenberg uncertainty principle reminds us that Eve's attack lowers the outcome that Bob is allowed to expect, so Eve's attack leads to a higher BER at Bob's end. Eve is not allowed by quantum mechanics laws (and BB84 protocol) to make perfect measurements. Actually in both attacks we presented, her BER is easily described as BER Eve (n) = BER(0, n/2).
Mutual Information
Alice and Bob try to create a common key. The mutual information that they are able to exchange is I (A, B) . The mutual information that Eve is able to collect is given by I(A, E). So the security achievement is easily described as S = I(A, B) − I(A, E). This expression can be expressed using the previously described BER: Figure 1 shows the differential mutual information as a function of the decision threshold for the two strategies. Consequently, to evaluate the security of the scheme Bob needs to:
• Sacrifice a small amount of the generated key, to evaluate his BER. With his BER he can evaluate I(A,B).
• Know the power at which Alice emits. It allows Bob to evaluate the maximum I(A,E) i. e. evaluate the influence of Eve in the worst case.
If the difference of mutual information is negative, the key must be dropped. In such a case, as no satisfying key has been produced, the link behave as if it has been subjected to a successful Denial of Service attack (DoS). Eve prevented us to generate a key.
Conclusion
We were able to quantify unconditional security regions under some attacks in terms of the dual-threshold of our QKD homodyne scheme. Bob is able to detect a probable eavesdropping attack. Thus he can drop the key before any secret has been revealed to Eve.
